In 1960, Washington watched aghast as Fidel Castro’s post-Revolution government seized companies and assets it viewed as the spoils of vanquished U.S. imperialism. Among the biggest prizes were two plants that sat above some of the largest nickel and cobalt deposits in the world. The United States had acquired one of them to secure a strategic supply of nickel for armor plating and aircraft engines during World War II. But the revolutionaries lacked know-how, and soon, the operations were struggling. “Cuban Mining Industry Virtually Destroyed in First Two Years of Castro Regime,” read a January 1961 New York Times headline, “PITS ARE CLOSED, FACTORIES SILENT.”
The Cuban regime turned to its Cold War patron, as it did for so much else in its early years. Soviet engineers and mining specialists retooled the Nicaro plant and the Moa Bay nickel complex into pillars of the island’s economy and icons of Cuban sovereignty, funding power plants and social programs. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Castro sought a replacement savior closer to home in a 1994 deal with Sherritt International, a Canadian nickel and cobalt miner and refiner. Cuba provided the ore and labor. Sherritt brought capital, refining technology, and access to global markets.
The U.S. tried repeatedly to sever that lifeline for Havana, including with a Bill Clinton–era law that barred any profits being recouped from property confiscated after the 1959 revolution. But the nickel and cobalt kept flowing. Nickel—raw or semifinished—was Cuba’s third-largest export in 2024, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, and China was the top recipient.
Now the Trump administration has targeted those industries anew as part of its all-points campaign to overpower the post-Castro regime. Other elements of that drive have been deliberately attention-grabbing. The Justice Department recently indicted 94-year-old Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother and successor, for the alleged downing of planes that killed three Americans and a U.S. resident 30 years ago. The USS Nimitz, an aircraft carrier, has moved into the Caribbean, much as the USS Gerald R. Ford approached Venezuela before the ouster of the dictator Nicolás Maduro. CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently made a highly unusual visit to his intelligence counterpart in Havana. And Secretary of State Marco Rubio marked Cuban Independence Day with a video message in Spanish telling Cubans that their government is to blame for their “unimaginable hardships.”
The blow that landed on May 1—packaged as a wonkish executive order—was much less flashy but did more immediate damage. The presidential decree imposed new sanctions on companies doing business with the regime, significantly expanding the comprehensive embargo and making it akin to those aimed at countries such as Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Within a week, Sherritt said that it would dissolve its partnership with the state-owned General Nickel Company, ending the Moa Nickel joint venture and other interests in electricity generation and natural gas.
Sherritt’s move spelled serious trouble for an economy already on the brink. For many months, the U.S. has enforced a blockade that stops Venezuelan and Mexican oil shipments from reaching Cuba. Factories have gone idle. Public transportation sputters. Long lines for basic goods stretch through Havana. Blackouts are commonplace. President Miguel Díaz-Canel described the U.S. sanctions as “collective punishment” on the Cuban people.
Then, last week, Sherritt announced it would only suspend its joint venture in Cuba and was in talks to sell a controlling ownership stake in Sherritt to Gillon Capital, with the apparent blessing of the U.S. State and Treasury Departments. Gillon is a Dallas-based firm that belongs to the family of Ray Washburne, a real-estate executive who served in the first Trump administration; neither firm responded to a request for comment.
Such a deal, if it goes through, could potentially bring the saga of Cuba’s mineral riches full circle by returning nickel and cobalt mines to U.S. ownership at a time when they have acquired a new strategic importance. Both minerals are used in manufacturing, including of cellphones and car batteries, and both help explain why the Trump administration is eager to bring Cuba to heel, one way or another.
Trump has not been seeking to normalize relations with the post-Castro regime so much as force a conditional surrender. Ratcliffe made the point to the Cubans last week while the president, Rubio, and several members of the administration’s senior foreign-policy team were dining on crispy beef ribs and roast duck in Beijing. The CIA chief’s mission to Havana was to “personally deliver President Trump’s message that the United States is prepared to seriously engage on economic and security issues, but only if Cuba makes fundamental changes,” a CIA official told me. Ratcliffe also warned that Trump’s threats should be treated as credible, the implication being that if the U.S. military could pluck Maduro from his home in Caracas, it could do the same to leaders in Havana. The U.S. carrier now lurking in the Caribbean serves as a constant reminder.
As with Venezuela, the United States sees Cuba as an unwelcome outpost of Russian and Chinese influence, not so much a Cold War relic as a current national-security threat sitting 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Ratcliffe’s discussions were held “against the backdrop that Cuba can no longer be a safe haven for adversaries in the Western Hemisphere,” the CIA official said.
The squeeze on Cuba’s nickel and cobalt operations fits into another area of geopolitical rivalry: the race for critical-minerals dominance. China is far ahead and uses its market power to dictate global terms. The Trump administration is trying to reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese supplies through sanctions, export controls, and an aggressive tariffs structure, as well as by imposing stiff penalties on businesses that rely on Chinese technology. Those are part of a broader effort to persuade mineral-rich countries in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia to redirect critical-minerals supply chains toward the United States. Diversifying away from China is often a condition of access to U.S. markets and financing.
Interior Secretary Doug Burgum is at the center of this initiative. He told me in a written response that the U.S. would like to see a critical-minerals partnership with Cuba that could create economic opportunities for “both the American and Cuban people.” But, he added, “the economic trajectory of Cuba will not change as long as the people who are in charge of it now remain in power.”
For decades, the red earth around the eastern Cuban town of Moa fueled the Cuban Revolution. The site of the joint venture with Sherritt still holds nearly a quarter century of remaining reserves, according to estimates from Sherritt. What its riches will power next may depend on the fate of Sherritt and its joint venture but Cuba could in theory become an important piece of Washington’s strategy for countering Beijing. Such a deal might also pave the way for other American businesses; Trump is enamored of the opportunities a pliant Cuba could offer domestic businesses, several U.S. officials told me, much as it did in the Fulgencio Batista era, leading up to the 1959 revolution.
But Havana, too, may have some leverage. The Trump administration blew up a Canadian company’s business in order to tighten the screws on the regime. But Cuba may be tempted to respond by offering shares in one of its crown jewels to an ally, or at least threatening to do so. “This is a good chance for China and Russia to step back in,” Diego von Vacano, a political-science professor and Latin America specialist at Texas A&M University, told me. In that case, the Trump administration might find that its drive to humble a tiny nearby regime hands further advantage to its chief adversaries in a much bigger, more important battle.
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