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The Houthis Are the World’s Problem

Yet for now, Saudi Arabia is combatting them alone.

This article was originally published by The Atlantic and is republished here under license.

In late October, I met a Yemeni military officer at a high-end mall in Riyadh. He wore a dishdasha and had the gruff, weary manner of an aging career soldier. His unit had been fighting the Houthi militia in southern Yemen, more than 800 miles from the immaculate, marble-floored refuge at the center of the Saudi capital where we ordered coffee.

He was mapping the battlefield on the table with his hands, describing how the latest round of fighting had played out, when cellphones began beeping simultaneously all around us: an incoming-missile warning. Moments later, loud booms echoed through the mall, followed by audible gasps from nearby tables and a child’s cry of fear. Shoppers froze in their tracks, some glancing anxiously toward the glass dome above us.  

The Yemeni officer looked at me without speaking. A grim smile played on his lips, as if to say: They are all learning about the Houthis now.

The missiles were intercepted, but the moment stayed with me. A new reality was intruding on a population coddled for years by visions of a frictionless post-oil future, when new technologies would keep everyone happy and entertained.

Saudi Arabia is at war. The Houthis have demonstrated, by means of recurring missile barrages, that they can shut down much of the country’s economy at will. A deadly strike on the main airport in Riyadh killed at least 14 people in mid-October and injured hundreds. More than a month later, few flights have resumed.

“The kingdom today faces the most dangerous crisis in its history, the Saudi journalist Abdulrahman al-Rashed told a Saudi podcaster last month.

That kind of candor is extremely hard to come by in Saudi Arabia. None of the Saudi or Yemeni officials I met in Riyadh in October would speak with me on the record. They told me that the monarchy is now taking the Houthi threat far more seriously than in the past. Riyadh has struck deals to bring thousands of soldiers from Pakistan and Syria to help defend the country’s border with Yemen. But these efforts may not be enough. The Houthis are building up their forces too, with help from Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia.

[Graeme Wood: The only thing the Houthis have done successfully]

The Houthis are no longer the rebel upstarts of a decade ago. They are well on their way to becoming the North Korea of the Arab world: an insular, well-armed, and fanatical statelet that poses a threat to the entire region. They have an AI-assisted weapons industry and have studied the Ukraine war; their information operations are way ahead of their Saudi and Yemeni rivals’. The Houthis could soon become more dangerous than Iran, their long-standing patron.

The Saudi military was not designed for this kind of war. The country’s rulers have long been reluctant to build an army that could one day pose a threat to the monarchy. Even now they have dismissed the notion of sending their own troops, apart from elite special forces already deployed in Yemen, to fight the Houthis. But they may soon find that you cannot rely on foreigners when your country is facing a very real threat of invasion.  

The current Houthi military offensive began in September, when the group captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia’s leaders believe that this plan was largely devised by Iran. In October, I met with a senior Saudi official who described a strategy coordinated by Tehran and its allies in the “Axis of Resistance” over the past several months. The latest chapter, the official said, began in the spring, when President Trump ordered the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. That left Tehran with limited options to retaliate, so Iranian officials met with their Houthi allies and persuaded them to launch an offensive on the Bab el-Mandeb.

The Iranians, the official said, agreed to help make it happen. A Houthi delegation attended the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran in July, he told me, and when it returned, the Mahan Air flight that carried it also conveyed a whole team of Axis military technicians and commanders, including two North Koreans, a Syrian who had been part of the Assad regime, and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite militia. The plane was loaded with cash and weapons, including drone parts and missile-guidance systems, the Saudi official told me. (Some details of the Mahan Air flight have been reported previously, including the weapons and Iranian officers on board.)

The Saudis had gotten word of the plane’s cargo and bombed the runway of the airport in the Yemeni capital to prevent it from landing. But the flight was diverted to Hodeida, a city on the Red Sea coast that is also under Houthi control, and landed there. Separately, the Saudi official told me, Russia delivered a large shipment of weapons and technology, concealed under thousands of tons of wheat.

If the Saudi official’s account is accurate, it would suggest that the Houthis are receiving more international support than ever. Even if the report was exaggerated for the benefit of an American journalist—Saudi officials are desperate to get more military assistance from the United States—it still points to a larger truth about what the Houthis have become.

The Houthis are the world’s problem. They have proved that they can block a waterway that carries about 15 percent of the world’s trade. They now control about a third of Yemen’s territory and most of its population, and aim to conquer it all. Their use of child soldiers has been well documented for a decade, as has their frequent use of torture, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances. Their rule is rooted in a revolutionary ideology that does not stop at Yemen’s borders and that thrives on constant war. They have challenged Saudi control of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities, and they often boast that they will liberate Jerusalem.

[Thomas Wright: The price of defeat in Iran]

These are not empty ambitions. The Houthis are constantly expanding their missile and drone production, using fiber optics and other materials supplied by China. Evidence recently came to light that they have used the AI tool Claude to improve their guided-missile technology. They have developed pragmatic relationships with al-Qaeda and the al-Shabaab terrorist group, despite sectarian differences (the Houthis adhere to an offshoot of Shiite Islam; the other two groups are Sunni). And, in a show of political dexterity and ideological fervor, they have been recruiting and providing training to ethnic and tribal subgroups throughout the Horn of Africa, in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. These outreaches appear to be modeled on Iran’s efforts to build up regional allies, and could add more tinder to an already volatile region of Africa.

For now, Saudi Arabia lies on the front line of any effort to contain the Houthis’ power. The United States is too deep in its war with Iran to provide anything more than minimal help, and the Europeans are focused on Ukraine. The other Gulf countries have good reasons to fight the Houthis, but for various reasons, they will not.

The Omanis have been hedging their bets for years—allowing the Houthis to smuggle arms across their border with Yemen and providing some intelligence—in case the Houthis end up as the winners. The United Arab Emirates fought the Houthis inside Yemen for years alongside the Saudis, but late last year, long-running tensions between the two countries reached a breaking point, and the Saudis ordered the Emiratis to withdraw. The Emiratis’ absence has damaged the broader war effort.

The Saudis, who have long backed the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden, organized a counteroffensive after the Houthis captured the Bab el-Mandeb. They embedded Saudi commandos with Yemeni government forces across the country. Some were killed in a devastating Houthi strike on October 19. The Saudi official I met in Riyadh told me that the near-term goal is to recapture all of the territory that was lost in September, and then secure some kind of truce. The Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have not yet achieved that, and it is not clear that they will. “I don’t see a way out unless the U.S. agrees to provide direct air support,” Nadwa al-Dawsari, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, told me.

Even if the Saudis are able to achieve a respite from the fighting, the Houthis will retain the whip hand in the conflict, because they will still be able to strike the kingdom’s airports and oil facilities. And they will surely use any truce to continue expanding their military, as they have in the past. The Saudi official told me that the kingdom’s long-term plan is to build a larger and more unified Yemeni military that is capable of pushing the Houthis back and “eliminating their military capabilities.”

That is a tall order. The Yemeni military officer I met in Riyadh last month described a fighting force that is hamstrung by clashing political and regional loyalties. “There are forces loyal to Islah”—the Yemeni Islamist party—“and they hate us,” he said, referring to his own more secular faction. (He did not need to add that the feeling is mutual.) In the south, many of the soldiers are more interested in creating a separate state than in fighting the Houthis. “The Houthis know all about the divisions on our side,” the officer said, “and they take advantage of it.”

The Saudis bring problems of their own to the conflict. One is the kingdom’s culture of entitlement and corruption, which has bled into its behavior in Yemen. For decades, the Saudis maintained their influence in Yemen through a patronage system of stipends paid to tribal sheikhs and military figures, and they took a quasi-imperial view of Yemenis as primitive underlings. They had a reputation for paying their proxy soldiers so poorly or so late that some had to sell their weapons in order to feed their children.

This pattern of behavior generated deep resentment, partly because the Yemenis got a glimpse of a different approach. The Emiratis spent decades fostering a culture of discipline and accountability in their own country, and in Yemen, they had a reputation for training their allies, paying them higher salaries, and demanding results in return. The Emiratis—who run a small but highly effective military of their own—therefore had far more success with their Yemeni recruits. The Saudis say they are reforming their system, but that will take time.

The Saudis and their allies are now struggling to relieve the month-long Houthi siege of Taiz, one of Yemen’s largest cities. If the Houthis capture it, nothing but open roads will separate them from Aden, the base of Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its military headquarters. “There is nothing going on to defend Aden,” Henry Thompson, a Yemen expert who has worked with the United Nations, told me. (Just in the past few days, the threat to Aden has grown, and some signs of defensive preparations have become evident there.)

The Houthis, meanwhile, have taken measures in the territories they control that could pull Yemeni troops into protracted conflict even if they succeed in retaking ground. Some recent seizures of cargo destined for Houthi ports have intercepted equipment for digging tunnels, including excavation tools and ventilation systems. The Houthis appear to have successfully imported large quantities of this kind of gear in recent years.

[Robert F. Worth: Saudi Arabia is running out of options]

“In Hodeida, the Houthis have built a city underneath the city,” Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemen analyst and the founder of the Basha Report, a geopolitical-risk advisory firm, told me. “For anyone trying to capture that place, it would be like going into Gaza.”

For the moment, the war is not going well. After making some gains in October, the Saudi-backed forces announced on November 15 that they had been forced to withdraw from the area around the Bab el-Mandeb. I met several members of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in Riyadh—their rear base—and they tried to put on a brave face, with varying degrees of success. Some seem resigned to deeper losses. “The Houthis will take Aden, and they will keep going,” one told me.

The current battlefield is in southern Yemen, but everyone I spoke with agreed that the Houthis will eventually open a new front in the north and attempt to invade Saudi Arabia. That would make it impossible for the Saudis to deny that they are at war. Until now, they have held firmly to the claim that this is an intra-Yemeni conflict, and that Saudi Arabia is a third party. But the Houthis have made clear for years that they consider themselves to be at war with Riyadh, and they frequently mock Yemen’s internationally recognized government as a Saudi fig leaf.

Almost no one in Saudi Arabia wants to acknowledge the possibility that they could soon be forced to defend their country. “Why should we send our young men to defend the Bab el-Mandeb?” one official asked me in Riyadh. “The conflict is inside Yemen.” He went on to describe the Houthis as nothing more than an “annoyance.”

None of the ordinary Saudis I spoke with in Riyadh, whether old friends or people I approached in cafés, seemed comfortable talking about the war. Saudi Arabia is an autocratic society where dissent can land a person in jail—but the reticence may also reflect the dissonance people feel between the war and everything their ruler has been telling them for the past decade. Saudi Arabia’s problems are supposed to be solved through technology and innovation. Being dragged into a bloody war with a radical militia is not part of that plan.

It is not part of America’s plans, either—especially not since the Trump administration waged an expensive and largely futile air war against the Houthis lasting seven weeks in early 2025. But that could change. The Houthis, like their Iranian allies, believe that they are waging a metaphysical battle against America, and they are determined to topple every outpost of American influence in the region.

*Illustration sources: Kay Nietfeld / Picture Alliance / Getty; Arne Hodalic / Getty; Encyclopaedia Britannica / Universal Images Group / Getty; Wolfgang Kaehler / LightRocket / Getty; Mohammed Huwais / AFP / Getty; Mohammad Daher / NurPhoto / Getty

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