Nine months into the United States and Israel’s war on Iran, the Islamic Republic rules over a shattered economy and a society weary of the limbo between war and peace. The Iranian regime is deeply unpopular, but the opposition, divided over the war and faced with brutal repression, has no strategic path forward.
The regime has executed 74 political prisoners since the war broke out, and more than 100 others remain on death row, according to the Oslo-based organization Iran Human Rights. Small acts of nonconformity, even when they are not explicitly political, can incur harsh punishment. Several café owners in Tehran are being prosecuted for celebrating Halloween. At least 118 Baha’is have been arrested or summoned to court in recent months for the crime of following a faith unrecognized by the regime. On Tuesday, security forces raided the home of the women’s-rights activist Sepideh Qolian, in the southwestern city of Dezful. She wasn’t there—so they beat her father and teenage niece and arrested them, along with her brother, instead.
“A lot of us were happy when the dictator was killed,” a 40-year-old teacher in Tehran told me, referring to the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. “But the war has turned a religious dictatorship into a military dictatorship. Even our teachers’ union can’t do its basic work anymore.” (He and others who spoke with me from Iran asked for their names to be withheld for their safety.)
Many of the Iranians I spoke with linked the ferocity of the current repression to the conflict. “After the war, we can’t even stage civic protests anymore,” a Karaj-based left-leaning journalist in his 30s told me. “The war was supposed to bring freedom, but it has suffocated it. We now have so little hope for advancing progressive and democratic demands.”
Precisely because the war raised so many hopes, the disappointment with current conditions is particularly bitter. And that disappointment extends to the person who perhaps most embodied the notion that outside intervention could bring freedom: the opposition leader and former crown prince Reza Pahlavi. Last winter he promoted the conflict as a vehicle for popular Iranian aspirations. Even he has now recalibrated, if subtly: “We needed this humanitarian intervention and we do not apologize for it,” Pahlavi said earlier this month, while accepting the Freedom Prize in Frankfurt on behalf of the Iranian people. But he added that he grieved “every innocent Iranian lost in this war” and that Iranians didn’t want to see their country bombed.
Pahlavi’s alignment with the Israeli-American attacks on Iran has posed problems for some of his supporters, two people close to his group told me. At least two of his former staffers became critics over the issue. One of these is Mehrdad Marty Youssefiani, his former chief of staff, who told me that he considered Pahlavi’s camp to be “in violation of fundamental national values.” Pahlavi’s mother, Iran’s former queen, Farah Pahlavi, came out against the war, in what may have been an indirect rebuke to her son. A well-known pro-Pahlavi documentary filmmaker last month also condemned the war and those who supported it—implicitly including Pahlavi.
Esmail Abdi, a former trade unionist who now heads the exile-based Iran Freedom Congress, suggested to me that Pahlavi’s support for the war left him with a lot to answer for. “We must ask him: How does foreign intervention help with Iran’s political independence, sovereignty, and democracy? We’ve seen that war doesn’t bring freedom.” The Karaj-based journalist told me of Pahlavi, “When Iranians were dying under air strikes, he sent condolences messages for American soldiers but not for thousands of killed Iranian civilians. This has definitely cost him some support. It was a big mistake by him.”
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Many of Pahlavi’s supporters also criticize the role he played in the demonstrations last winter. Pahlavi called Iranians to the streets on January 8, having previously assured them that he had secured the defections of more than 50,000 of the regime’s security forces and civil servants. The regime massacred thousands of protesters, and no defectors materialized. Nor did a follow-up plan from the former crown prince.
“I am upset at him because he lied to us,” a young woman in Tehran who took part in pro-Pahlavi protests in January told me. “We thought he was ready to come back to the homeland. We believed him when he said he had the support of thousands of defectors. Our trust is now tarnished.”
Nonetheless, Pahlavi retains a significant social base inside Iran. On Tuesday, demonstrators in the small city of Abdanan in western Iran, which had been the site of major demonstrations back in January, chanted his name. Ali, an artist who left Iran for Europe a few months ago and doesn’t support the crown prince, conceded to me that he thought Pahlavi would win a free election if one were held tomorrow.
And Pahlavi has not given up. Writing in a Belgian newspaper earlier this month, he unveiled a plan that includes building a movement inside the country, securing defections from the regime’s security forces, uniting the Iranian diaspora, and winning support from the West. The trouble is that little in his past shows him capable of carrying out that strategy. Last month, he started a new initiative asking “not just military and government personnel” but “Iranians from every walk of life” to join his camp by communicating with an AI-powered bot on the messaging app Telegram.
Not a single prominent political official or diplomat of the Islamic Republic has publicly joined Pahlavi. He recently said that he would hesitate before calling for another street uprising, because he wouldn’t want more people to be killed. Yet in September, Pahlavi advocated arming anti-regime Iranians—an inflammatory step that one Iranian journalist decried as “promoting civil war” and “a new level of vileness.”
Further complicating his efforts, Pahlavi’s movement, which once promised to be unifying, has turned exclusionary in recent years. His close advisers have derisively referred to other opponents of the regime as “79ers,” identifying them with the revolutionary coalition that brought down the shah in 1979, and which encompassed liberal nationalists, Marxists, and Islamists, among others. Last year, Pahlavi’s supporters in Iran threw stones at the Nobel peace laureate Narges Mohammadi, a human-rights activist, at a speech she gave. Earlier this month, the actor Taraneh Alidoosti met with broad public sympathy when she appeared without hijab at the funeral of her father, Hamid, a well-known footballer. Yet Pahlavi supporters attacked her online. When Pahlavi issued condolences for the footballer, he didn’t mention Taraneh by name. Mohammadi and Alidoosti represent a liberal and feminist section of the opposition.
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Such attitudes make Pahlavi at best a factional leader, not the unifying transitional figure he claims, and once appeared, to be. But other sections of the opposition don’t have a clear path forward, either. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq, with its eclectic mix of Maoist and Islamist convictions, remains enormously unpopular. The Kurdish and Balochi ethnic groups have occasionally mounted armed uprisings, but these have been limited to small areas in Iran’s remote southwest and southeastern regions. The Iranian Freedom Congress has brought together an impressive array of pro-democracy voices but hasn’t taken much political initiative since it was founded earlier this year.
These groups are all headquartered in exile. Inside Iran, any oppositional act is punished harshly, as the treatment meted out to Qolian shows. Pro-democracy advocates include former regime officials (such as the former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the former deputy interior minister, Mostafa Tajzadeh), as well as nationalists, feminists, socialists, and liberals. But the regime has imprisoned most of the best-known figures from these groups and effectively stopped them from so much as holding meetings. Even Pahlavi’s latest strategy starts with a movement inside the country with room enough to breathe.
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