Asian countries hoping to resist China’s ambitions for regional supremacy might look to a recent art festival in South Korea for inspiration. The Gwangju Biennale, founded in 1994 to celebrate Asian culture and South Korea’s democracy, erupted in controversy in September over the organizers’ decision to grant Taiwan its own self-named pavilion—in defiance of Beijing’s purported claims to the island. But despite the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s demands that the South Korean authorities rectify this “grave violation,” the Biennale’s organizers refused to budge. China’s unappeased delegation pulled out of the festival in a huff. The incident offered the other attendees a valuable lesson: China needn’t always get its way.
China’s neighbors would do well to keep this in mind during this week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. On its surface, the annual gathering of leaders of countries throughout the Pacific region, including the United States, will be a showcase of China’s growing power. As the summit’s host, Chinese President Xi Jinping has savvily invited his guests to the tech hub Shenzhen, home to leading robotics manufacturers, the telecommunications firm Huawei, top drone makers, and roving robotaxis. Meanwhile, President Trump, Xi’s main counterweight in the region, will arrive tomorrow as a diminished figure—unpopular at home, entangled in a costly and controversial war abroad, and presiding over a party that voters just cast out of Congress. Washington’s traditional allies in the region have already been rattled by Trump’s unexpected turn toward China in his second term. Countries such as Australia are now working to figure out how to protect themselves against China’s encroaching power without the assurance of American support.
“If the U.S. isn’t there, we are going to be a little bit more circumspect about how we stand up to China,” Gordon Flake, the chief executive of the Perth USAsia Centre at the University of Western Australia, told me. “But it doesn’t mean we won’t do it.”
Unlike European leaders, who are similarly trying to defend their interests against China amid a breakdown in the Atlantic alliance, the countries of Asia lack a unifying body to coordinate policy or assert collective power. The European Union can press Beijing for concessions on trade with Europe’s common market, but the Pacific region’s various governments must negotiate deals on their own. Compared with EU members, these countries are also more politically and economically diverse—some are wealthy and some are poor; some are democracies and some are not. This makes delivering a single unified message more challenging. More than 70 percent of people in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia view China favorably, compared with less than 30 percent in South Korea and India, and 11 percent in Japan, according to survey data from the Pew Research Center.
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Yet the stakes for countering China’s rise are higher in Asia than anywhere else. China’s economy is far and away the most dominant in the region—more than four times that of Japan, Asia’s second-biggest economy. Xi has worked to project China’s power throughout the world, but he is most interested in ruling over his own neighborhood. As he declared in a pivotal 2014 speech that marked the country’s turn toward a more assertive regional policy, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia,” in clear opposition to foreign interference in the region. “The Chinese people, in their pursuit of the Chinese dream of great national renewal, stand ready to support and help other peoples in Asia to realize their own great dreams.”
Most countries in the region would prefer to realize their own dreams without China’s “support.” Despite Trump’s inconsistent approach to maintaining ties with long-standing allies, countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are wary of partnering with Xi’s new imperial order instead. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, having touted the importance of “a multipolar Asia,” dismissed the Asia-for-Asians idea as unrealistic in 2022: “A narrow Asian chauvinism is actually against the continent’s own interest.”
India’s leaders have good reason to resist China’s ambitions, which have involved expanding its economic and military influence into South Asia, testing New Delhi’s resolve along their shared Himalayan border, and supporting Pakistan, India’s bitter rival. Beijing “thinks that India needs to accept subordinate status to China,” Manoj Joshi, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, told me. But “India is not willing to accept that in any way it is second to China.”
Beijing’s contentious territorial claims have other neighbors on edge as well. Xi’s extensive military drills around Taiwan have raised fears of a devastating regional war. His insistent claim to nearly all of the South China Sea keeps China in almost-constant conflict with the Philippines. In July, the Philippine government accused China’s coast guard of allegedly injuring a Filipino sailor in the South China Sea, lamenting in a statement: “We simply cannot trust this belligerent neighbor.” Last month, the Chinese ambassador in Manila drew sharp criticism for provocatively claiming that China “may easily win” a war against the Philippines—though he denied that he was making a threat.
Xi has attempted to soften these political conflicts with promises of economic cooperation, but any hope that China’s rise would lift other countries has faded. The same state-subsidized Chinese exports that have threatened industries in the United States and Europe have undercut various sectors throughout Asia as well. Trade with Southeast Asian countries accounts for nearly a quarter of China’s global trade surplus. Chinese companies are expanding their market share in manufacturing industries that are central to South Korea’s economy, such as shipbuilding, batteries, and petrochemicals. Xi has sought to use China’s growing economic might to coerce neighbors to concede to his political demands. Beijing halted supplies of rare earth elements to Japan in January after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi warned that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could trigger a military response. (Despite this pressure, Japan has not withdrawn its comment.)
Even as Trump has cozied up to Xi over the past year, his administration has tried to reassure Asian allies of its continued support. The U.S. conducted naval drills with the Philippines and Japan in the South China Sea in July. Just before this year’s APEC summit, Trump met with his fellow leaders from Australia, India, and Japan for talks about enhanced cooperation on AI, critical minerals, and maritime security, with new plans for joint military exercises to counter China’s power. But other moves add to traditional U.S. allies’ unease. Trump has delayed approval of a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, presumably to stay on better terms with Xi. Last year Trump flew all the way to South Korea to meet with Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit, but skipped the summit itself.
In the absence of clear signals from Washington, Asian leaders have tightened ties with one another. In 2017, when Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional trade pact designed to isolate China, the other 11 members moved forward without the United States. Japan has expanded its relationships in the region, in part by offering aid to strengthen the defense capabilities of other Asian countries. Australia and India have deepened their collaboration through expanded intelligence-sharing and joint military exercises.
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But leaders in the region must tread carefully. They all have close trade links to China and can’t risk alienating their vindictive neighbor. Akio Takahara, an expert on diplomacy at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, told me that Chinese leaders actively “try to disturb any attempt by other countries to link up.”
Ironically, the more powerful China becomes, the more necessary the U.S. is as a counterweight. Flake told me that although there is “acute concern about the reliability of the United States,” policy makers in Australia still view this alliance as crucial to the country’s security—and “there is no clear Plan B.” Instead, they are “striving to get the United States back to where the United States has been.”
The fact that the U.S. is still indispensable in Asia indicates the extent of Xi’s failure to dominate the region. Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy has delivered Xi a chance to expand Chinese influence at America’s expense, but the Chinese leader’s heavy-handed pursuit of power has ultimately left the door open for a U.S. revival in his own backyard. Instead of treating his neighbors like imperial subjects, Xi might consider letting Chinese artists participate in the Gwangju Biennale next time and enjoy the party.
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